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Introduction: The Robert Koch Institute (RKI) managed 
the exchange of cross-border contact tracing data 
between public health authorities (PHA) in Germany 
and abroad during the early COVID-19 pandemic. Aim: 
We describe the extent of cross-border contact tracing 
and its challenges. Methods: We analysed cross-bor-
der COVID-19 contact tracing events from 3 February to 
5 April 2020 using information exchanged through the 
European Early Warning Response System and commu-
nication with International Health Regulation national 
focal points. We described events by PHA, number of 
contacts and exposure context. Results: The RKI pro-
cessed 467 events, initiating contact to PHA 1,099 
times (median = 1; interquartile range (IQR): 1–2) and 
sharing data on 5,099 contact persons. Of 327 (70%) 
events with known exposure context, the most com-
monly reported exposures were aircraft (n = 64; 20%), 
cruise ships (n = 24; 7%) and non-transport contexts 
(n = 210; 64%). Cruise ship and aircraft exposures gen-
erated more contacts with authorities (median = 10; 
IQR: 2–16, median = 4; IQR: 2–11) and more contact 
persons (median = 60; IQR: 9–269, median = 2; IQR: 
1–3) than non-transport exposures (median = 1; IQR: 
1–6 and median = 1; IQR: 1–2). The median time spent 
on contact tracing was highest for cruise ships: 5 days 
(IQR: 3–9). Conclusion: In the COVID-19 pandemic, 
cross-border contact tracing is considered a criti-
cal component of the outbreak response. While only 
a minority of international contact tracing activities 
were related to exposure events in transport, they 
contributed substantially to the workload. The numer-
ous communications highlight the need for fast and 
efficient global outbreak communication channels 
between PHA.
Introduction
Since January 2020, severe acute respiratory syn-
drome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has rapidly spread 
to become a global pandemic [1]. Active case finding, 
early detection and isolation of cases and their con-
tacts are essential for breaking transmission chains. A 
modelling study showed that 70% of contacts should 
be traced in order to control the outbreak, assuming a 
baseline reproduction rate of 2.5 [2].
Early warning systems for the serious cross-border 
spread of infectious pathogens include the International 
Health Regulations (IHR) 2005 and the Early Warning 
and Response System (EWRS) for the European Union/
European Economic Area (EU/EEA) countries [3,4]. 
Within Germany, communication channels have been 
established in accordance with the German Infection 
Protection Act (Infektionsschutzgesetz; IfSG). Cross-
border contact tracing at the national level is operated 
by the Robert Koch Institute (RKI), the federal public 
health institute in Germany.
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The first cases of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) 
in Germany occurred in Bavaria at the end of January 
2020 [5]. The first SARS-CoV-2 cluster also led to cross-
border contacts and exposures on flights since close 
contacts and suspected cases travelled to Austria and 
Spain after exposure. This required intensive inter-
national communication to identify and share the 
information on contacts with the responsible health 
authorities. An international communication and con-
tact tracing team (RKI IC-Team) was rapidly created in 
the RKI COVID-19 Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) 
including members of all units of the department for 
infectious disease epidemiology and other depart-
ments at the RKI. The core task of the team was to 
collect and communicate information on confirmed 
COVID-19 cases and their contacts to other countries in 
the event of cross-border relevance. In addition, incom-
ing information on German citizens exposed abroad 
was communicated through the federal state health 
authorities to the responsible local health authorities 
in Germany.
The spread of SARS-CoV-2 in Germany triggered the 
introduction of various measures: (i) mass gatherings 
with more than 1,000 participants were banned after 
calendar week 10, (ii) schools and public places were 
closed in several federal states, (iii) physical distanc-
ing measures of at least 1.5 m to another person were 
recommended, (iv) it was recommended to cancel 
non-essential travel and (v) quarantine measures for 
travellers from high risk areas entering Germany were 
introduced in calendar week 15. Because of the federal 
structure in Germany, the measures and their imple-
mentation varied between the states.
This work aimed to describe the extent and course 
of activities resulting from information on COVID-19 
exposure events with a cross-border context. Further, 
we discuss the challenges experienced and possible 
workflow improvements.
Methods
Information flow in the context of 
international contact tracing
Information on cross-border COVID-19 exposure events 
and personal data were shared between the RKI and 
EU/EEA countries via the EWRS communication plat-
form which provides a single-window messaging sys-
tem (so-called selective exchange) to communicate 
with EU/EEA countries and transmit personal data 
securely. The World Health Organization (WHO) mem-
ber states outside the EU/EEA received information 
through the IHR National Focal Point (NFP) by email. In 
Germany, the IHR NFP is located in the Joint Information 
and Situation Centre of the federal government and the 
federal states. Within Germany, email or telephone was 
used to communicate with health authorities. Personal 
data were transmitted using an encrypted exchange 
server (Cryptshare).
Upon receipt of information, the RKI IC-Team assessed 
the content and determined the required action. The 
COVID-19 case and contact person definition employed 
by the country transmitting the data was used accord-
ingly. The information was forwarded through the fed-
eral state health authority to the respective local public 
health authority (PHA) where the contact was living or 
currently staying. The local PHA then proceeded with 
contact tracing activities (i.e. telephone interview, reg-
ular monitoring) according to the IfSG. Similarly, infor-
mation from the local PHA concerning persons staying 
abroad during the infectious period was forwarded to 
the responsible foreign health authorities (Figure 1).
In addition to the local German PHA and PHA from for-
eign countries, the RKI was in contact with the German 
Federal Foreign Office and its embassies abroad.
Logistical considerations
The RKI IC-Team worked in two shifts per day. Outside 
office hours, an on-call epidemiologist was available. 
Standard operating procedures (SOPs) were developed 
to enable the continuity of work, and team members 
were regularly trained and regular opportunity for feed-
back was provided.
Data management and protection
Each incoming COVID-19 cross-border exposure event 
received an internal identifier (ID) to which all informa-
tion was assigned. The ID was documented in a line 
list including the date of the receipt of the initial com-
munication, the start of RKI activities, the last possible 
exposure date of the contacts to a confirmed COVID-19 
case, a description of the exposure, the affected coun-
tries, the number of contacts and an activity log for 
all communications. All personally identifiable infor-
mation on cases and contacts was stored in a sepa-
rate secure drive in accordance with the General Data 
Figure 1
Flow of information in the context of contact tracing in 
Germany and abroad
IHR NFP System EWRS
Local level: public health authority










EEA: European Economic Area; EWRS: Early Warning and Response 
System; EU European Union; FFO: German Federal Foreign 
Office; IHR NFP: International Health Regulations (2005) National 
Focal Point; MoH: German Federal Ministry of Health; WHO: 
World Health Organization.
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Protection Regulation (Directive 95/46/EC) [6]. When 
the outbreak activities are completed, this information 
will be permanently deleted.
Inclusion and exclusion criteria
We reviewed all COVID-19 cross-border exposure 
events involving Germany which triggered a contact 
tracing-related activity of the RKI IC-team. Included 
were all activities with at least one confirmed case or 
contact person of a confirmed COVID-19 case and the 
start date of RKI event-specific activities between 3 
February and 5 April 2020 (calendar weeks 6–14).
Data analysis
The number of COVID-19 cross-border exposure events 
processed by the RKI during the study period was ana-
lysed to assess:
• number of German and international authorities in 
contact with the RKI and communication channels 
used;
• context and country of the exposure events as well 
as number of contacts followed up;
• time course according to country and context of 
exposure;
• time delay (time between last exposure and start of 
RKI activities) and time duration (time between start 
and end of RKI activities).
We used the following information for each event: date 
of the initial communication, communication channel, 
start and end date of the RKI activities, country which 
initiated the communication, number of national and 
international authorities the RKI was in contact with, 
country where the exposure occurred, date of the last 
possible exposure, context of the exposure, and num-
ber of contact persons.
The results were summarised graphically and descrip-
tively using frequency counts (n), average (n), median 
(n), interquartile range (IQR; 25–75th percentile), range 
(min–max), and proportions (%). To determine differ-
ences between continuous variables, we used the 
Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test. The data analysis was 
conducted with Stata (software version 15, StataCorp).
Case studies of selected COVID-19 cross-border expo-
sure events were used to highlight extent and complex-
ity of cross-border contact tracing activities.
Definitions
We made a distinction between countries where com-
munication was carried out through EWRS in the EU/
EEA and communication which occurred through the 
IHR NFP. Each authority with whom the RKI was in con-
tact was counted once per event, the initially received 
information was not considered. The number of trans-
port providers, travel agencies or other companies that 
provided data on contact persons and exposures, as 
well as communication with the Federal Ministry of 
Health (MoH), were not included in the analysis.
If no information on the country of exposure was availa-
ble, the country which initiated the communication was 
used as the country of exposure. For events involving 
only contact persons in an aircraft or on a cruise ship, 
the country of exposure was indicated as ‘transna-
tional’, since the exposure occurred during the journey. 
Table 1
Authorities the RKI was in contact with, contact persons and days of time delay, COVID-19 contact tracing, Germany, 3 
February–5 April 2020 (n = 467)
Number of events Authorities the RKI was in contact with Contact persons Days of time delaya
n % n Median IQR n Median IQR Median IQR
Total 467 100 1,099 1 1–2 5,099 2 1–6 8 5–11
Country of initial communicationb
Germany 276 59.1 643 1 1–2 3,135 2 1–5 8 5–12
Abroad 191 40.9 456 1 1–2 1,964 2 1–8 8 5–11
Country of exposurec
Germany 164 35.1 249 1 1–2 326 1 1–3 10 7–14
Abroad 213 45.6 452 1 1–2 1,894 2 1–7 7 4–10
Transnational 90 19.3 398 2 1–5 2,879 8 2–16 7 5–10
COVID-19: coronavirus disease; IQR: interquartile range; RKI: Robert Koch Institute.
a Days of time delay were defined as time between last exposure of a contact person to a confirmed COVID-19 case and start of RKI activities.
b Comparison of median number of authorities involved between communication initiated from Germany or abroad yielded a p value of 0.128. 
Comparison of median number of contact persons between communication initiated from Germany or abroad yielded a p value of 0.021. 
Comparison of median time delay between communication initiated from Germany or abroad yielded a p value of 0.528 (Wilcoxon–Mann–
Whitney test).
c Comparison of median number of authorities involved between exposure in Germany or abroad yielded a p-value of 0.439. Comparison of 
median number of authorities involved between exposure in Germany or transnational and abroad or transnational, respectively, yielded 
a p value of < 0.001. Comparison of median number of contact persons between exposure in Germany or abroad, Germany or transnational 
and abroad or transnational, respectively, yielded a p value of < 0.001. Comparison of median time delay between exposure in Germany 
or abroad and abroad or transnational, respectively, yielded a p-value < 0.001. Comparison of median time delay between exposure in 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Possible means of transport included plane, ship, 
coach or taxi. For exposures not related to transport, a 
distinction was made between private overnight stays 
(e.g. hotel, guesthouse), professional events (e.g. con-
gress, business meetings) and other social contexts 
(e.g. carnival, restaurant).
For larger groups, or if the last date of contact between 
the case and the contacts was unknown, the last date 
on which contact may have occurred (e.g. last day of a 
holiday, last day of a cruise) was used as the exposure 
date.
Additional data source
Data available in Germany’s national reporting elec-
tronic database for communicable diseases (SurvNet@
RKI) were also reviewed to supplement missing infor-
mation on location and context of exposure for events 
notified within Germany [7].
Ethical statement
The data were collected within the legal framework 
of the IfSG, the EU Decision 1082/2013 and the IHR. 
For the analysis, only aggregated data are presented. 
The information in the case studies was anonymised. 
Therefore, approval from an ethics committee was not 
sought.
Results
Between 3 February and 5 April 2020 (calendar weeks 
6–14), 467 cross-border contact tracing events with 
exposures in 30 countries were included in the analy-
sis. The most frequent countries of exposure included 
Germany (n = 164; 35%), Austria (n = 101; 22%), Italy 
(n = 32; 7%) and Spain (n = 11; 2%). Outside the EU/EEA, 
Egypt, Israel and the United States were the most fre-
quent countries (n = 5 each; 1%). The country of expo-
sure was classified as transnational in 19% (n = 90). In 
59% (n = 267) of all events, Germany initiated the com-
munication and half of those events (n = 139) had also 
occurred there. In the case of 25 events, Germany was 
informed from abroad about an exposure in Germany.
The RKI IC-Team was in contact with different authori-
ties 1,099 times. Of these, 55% (n = 600) were commu-
nications with German PHA, 31% (n = 345) were with EU/
EEA countries via EWRS, 11% (n = 126) were with other 
countries via IHR NFPs and 3% (n = 28) were with the 
Federal Foreign Office or its embassies abroad. In 16 
events, there was no contact to any authority because 
the contact person’s place of residence could not be 
determined. These persons were contacted directly 
by the RKI if an email address or a phone number was 
available. The median number of authorities the RKI 
was in contact with was 1 (IQR: 1–2) per activity (Table 
1).
For 327 (70%) events, the exposure context was 
known. This included 93 (28%) events where the 
exposure occurred during transport (64 air travel, 24 
cruise ships, five coaches/taxis/others). The remaining 
events included exposures in hotels or guesthouses 
(n = 83; 25%), at congresses, trade fairs and other busi-
ness meetings (n = 64; 20%), or in other context such 
as private stays or gatherings (n = 63; 19%). In another 
24 (5%) of the 327 events, several exposure contexts 
were mentioned. The median number of authorities 
contacted was highest for events with exposures 
related to cruises (Table 2).
For 344 (74%) events, information on the number of 
contact persons was available. In total, data on 5,099 
contacts was shared, with a median of two contacts 
(IQR: 1–6) per event. Fewer contact persons per event 
were involved when the communication was initiated in 
Germany or when the country of exposure was Germany 
rather than abroad or transnational (Table 1). Most con-
tacts per event occurred on cruises (Table 2).
For 332 (71%) events, the date of exposure was known. 
The median time delay between date of exposure and 
receipt of the information by the RKI was 8 days (IQR: 
5–11). The median time duration of RKI activities was 
1 day (IQR: 1–3) and more among cruise-related expo-
sures than for aircraft, other means of transport and 
not transport-related exposures (5 days (IQR: 3–9) vs 
1 day (IQR: 1–4); p < 0.001, 3 days (IQR: 1–5); p = 0.255 
and 1 day (IQR: 1–3); p < 0.001). For aircraft related 
exposures, the duration was longer for flights with 
Figure 2
Number of cross-border COVID-19 contact tracing events 
and proportion of country of exposure, by week of activity 
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COVID-19: coronavirus disease; EEA: European Economic Area; EU 
European Union.
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arrival in Germany than for arrival abroad (median = 3 
days (IQR: 1–6) vs 1 day (IQR: 1–3); p = 0.012).
The total number of events increased starting in calen-
dar week 9, peaked with 126 events in calendar week 
12, and decreased to 75 events in calendar week 14. 
Detailed information regarding country and context of 
exposure is shown in Figures 2 and 3.
The average number of people working per day on 
these activities increased steadily and showed a peak 
in calendar week 13 with seven people (range: 5–8). The 
increase in incoming information from February 2020 
onwards required expansion of the team to accommo-
date the workload. Staff was recruited from all units of 
the Department for Infectious Disease Epidemiology at 
the RKI. To maintain high quality standards, training 
sessions as well as weekly team meetings and regular 
feedback groups were implemented.
Case studies
The following selected case studies illustrate three of 
the major COVID-19 cross-border contact tracing events 
involving Germany.
In early March 2020, the RKI was informed by a 
German regional PHA of a person who 2 days prior 
had attended an international business meeting in 
Germany with 24 people. On the day after the meeting, 
the person was tested for SARS-CoV-2. When the posi-
tive test result arrived, the case had already travelled 
through Germany by train and taken a flight to Egypt. 
The respective IHR NFP was immediately informed of 
the case’s travel for contact tracing on the flight and 
known contacts in Egypt. Contact tracing for the train 
was not possible since the tickets for the neighbour-
ing seats had been booked anonymously. The data on 
contact persons exposed during the business meeting 
were transmitted via EWRS to three EU/EEA countries. 
As the case also reported a holiday in South Tyrol, Italy 
in late February 2020 and onset of symptoms 4 days 
after the holiday 2020, information on fellow travellers 
was forwarded to the respective German federal states. 
Among them, three persons had become symptomatic 
in the meantime.
In early March 2020, the RKI was informed by a local 
PHA about two people who tested positive for SARS-
CoV-2, one who had become symptomatic at the 
beginning of March 2020 and an asymptomatic fellow 
traveller. Both had taken part in a cruise with 45 guest 
cabins for 2 weeks in mid-February 2020 and spent a 
1-week beach holiday afterwards. Subsequently, the 
IHR NFP Egypt was informed. The contact details of 
all persons participating in the cruise and residing at 
the hotel at the same time as the cases were collected 
and forwarded to the respective countries. Passengers 
seated in the same row as the confirmed cases or two 
rows in front and behind on the flight from Egypt to 
Germany were also investigated. Overall, data on 189 
contacts residing in Germany were transmitted to 15 
responsible health authorities. Moreover, five EU/EEA 
countries and one additional country outside the EU/
EEA were informed of, respectively, 44 and nine con-
tacts via EWRS and the IHR NFP.
The RKI was notified in late February 2020 by Italy 
about an Italian citizen who was tested SARS-CoV-2-
positive and had attended a 3-day meeting in Munich 
with 13 close contact persons. The case became symp-
tomatic 5 days before notification 2020. All participants 
had left Munich by the day after symptom onset of the 
case. Four contact persons had travelled by plane by 
the time of notification. One person took as many as 
seven flights. Data on contact persons was transmit-
ted to Spain, France, the Netherlands, Denmark and 
Sweden via EWRS, as well as to the respective German 
local PHA. To our knowledge, eight of 13 contacts at the 
meeting were later tested SARS-CoV-2-positive.
Discussion
This work describes cross-border contact tracing activi-
ties within Germany’s containment strategy of COVID-
19 during the early stages of the pandemic [8], focusing 
on active case finding, early detection and isolation 
of cases and contacts in order to prevent and control 
Figure 3
Number of cross-border COVID-19 contact tracing 
events, by exposure context and by week of activity start, 
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the spread of infection. In addition, we presented case 
studies to exemplify the complexity of contact tracing 
owing to global mobility and multiple exposures during 
travel, business meetings or vacations.
The increase in cross-border contact tracing activities 
from calendar week 8 onwards reflects the increase 
of COVID-19 cases reported in countries outside of 
China [9]. The decrease after calendar week 12 can be 
attributed to international travel restrictions, the travel 
warnings issued by the German Federal Government 
and national travel-related quarantine measures. 
Worldwide increasing case numbers and limited per-
sonnel resources of local PHA as well as a pause of con-
tact tracing on flights in Germany from 18 March 2020 
may have also contributed to the decreasing number of 
incoming contact tracing activities after calendar week 
12. Moreover, limited time for backtracking transmis-
sion routes may have led to the increasing number of 
events with an unknown exposure from calendar week 
11 onwards. The proportion of events with reported 
exposure in Germany increased from calendar week 13 
and reflects the increasing autochthonous case num-
bers in Germany.
The time delay from last possible exposure to start of 
RKI activities surpassed the median incubation period 
of COVID-19 [10,11]. This could be explained by the time 
it takes until a person seeks medical care, gets tested, 
is notified to the competent health authority and the 
initiation of investigations including forwarding of data 
to the RKI. Considering all these factors, such a time 
delay can be expected but still allows identifying poten-
tial secondary cases and interrupting transmission.
Travelling activities contributed to the geographical 
spread of SARS-CoV-2 infections [12-14] and therefore 
need to be considered as important events for contact 
tracing. While transport-related events did not repre-
sent the majority of the contact tracing events in our 
analysis, they were challenging and caused a long 
duration of RKI activities. Many international travellers 
in and from Germany generated numerous cross-border 
contacts in the transport sector. Moreover, the proxim-
ity between passengers due to limited space in public 
transport resulted in a large number of close contacts. 
Consequently, a large amount of personal data had to 
be distributed to different IHR NFPs, EU/EEA countries 
and/or local PHA in Germany. In this context, the com-
munication with commercial transport companies and 
tour operators and timely receipt of complete personal 
data including contact details of passengers was one 
of the main challenges.
Air travel made up 69% of events in the category of 
transport-related exposures. In aircraft, passengers 
seated in the same row as a confirmed COVID-19 case 
and those seated two rows in front and behind were 
classified as close contacts. This cut-off was based on 
the assumed infection risk and has also been applied 
in the past for contact tracing in aircraft in the context 
of other infectious diseases transmitted by droplets 
[15-19]. Since passengers in aircraft usually remain 
seated, the number of contacts who need follow-up 
after air travel was smaller than for other means of 
transport. Still, the workload and consequently the 
duration of RKI activities was higher for flights with a 
destination in Germany as in this case, Germany was 
responsible for retrieving the passenger data from the 
airline.
After careful considerations, the RKI decided to pause 
contact tracing related to air-travel during the first 
peak of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020 because 
there was limited evidence of SARS-CoV-2 transmission 
on aircraft at that time and because human resources 
needed to be used efficiently. Until the end of the data 
collection period, SARS-CoV-2 transmission events 
on flights have been reported sporadically [20-23]. 
More conclusive studies on in-flight transmissions are 
needed to estimate the associated risk. In addition, 
currently implemented measures such as wearing of 
facemasks in aircraft need to be considered and evalu-
ated. With the surge in travel activities after the relaxa-
tion of travel restrictions, Germany restarted contact 
tracing activities related to air travel exposure in cal-
endar week 29 but adjusted its recommendation and 
defined as close contacts the persons seated directly 
next to a confirmed COVID-19 case; others seated in 
the two rows in front or behind were considered as con-
tact persons with low-risk exposure.
That transmission among passengers and crew on 
cruise ships is particularly high has been reported in 
the literature [24-26]. In our analysis, the median num-
ber of contact persons related to ship travel was higher 
than that related to air travel. This can be explained 
by the long period of time passengers stay on the ship 
and movement and contacts associated with various 
activities such as restaurant visits, sports or entertain-
ment. The large number of contact persons and the 
extensive communication, compared with other expo-
sure contexts, led to a longer duration of RKI activities 
and a higher number of contacted stakeholders. The 
communication involved the German Federal Foreign 
Office and its embassies abroad and resulted in a long 
process of receiving and forwarding personal data of 
cases and contacts. Moreover, information on interna-
tional travel routes of contact persons who had already 
disembarked had to be requested and followed up 
since the stay on a cruise ship was often only one part 
of a vacation route.
For many other means of transport including coaches 
and trains, conveyance operators do not systemati-
cally store passenger lists, seat reservations or the 
actual seat taken, which complicated the identifica-
tion of close contacts. Because of the lack of standard 
procedures to handle passenger data, communication 
with conveyance and tour operators required a signifi-
cant amount of time and human resources. Moreover, 
the completeness of the data varied widely across 
providers.
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The effectiveness of communication with national and 
international PHA largely depended on the existing 
communication channels. The EWRS platform, which 
provides a single-window messaging system, facili-
tated direct communication with national PHA of EU/
EEA countries and the United Kingdom as well as the 
safe transfer of personal data in compliance with the 
European Data Protection Regulation [6]. In contrast, 
communication with PHA in Germany and IHR NFP out-
side the EU/EEA required exchanging information by 
email and using an encrypted platform to share per-
sonal data. This was time-consuming and technically 
challenging since some recipients reported technical 
difficulties in retrieving data.
Owing to the federal structure of Germany, the legal 
responsibility of outbreak investigation lies with the 
municipal level. Within this task, RKI supported the 
PHA in international communication related to cross-
border contract tracing during the COVID-19 pan-
demic. This led to a rapid increase of data exchange 
and adaption of the established communication routes 
with local PHA, which was a main challenge without a 
single-window messaging system. Moreover, missing 
information on exposure context, test date and symp-
toms of confirmed cases contributed to the duration of 
RKI activities. Still, the involvement of RKI as a national 
coordination point for international contact tracing 
activities was reported by local and regional PHA as 
a great support and an efficient way to pool and dis-
tribute relevant information on cross-border exposure 
events in time.
The data presented here were collected during the 
daily routine work of the RKI COVID-19 EOC and are 
thus subject to limitations. The number of contacts 
recorded did not reflect the total number of persons 
who had contact with a COVID-19 case in a cross-bor-
der context, since only information on contact persons 
related to Germany (e.g. residency or possible expo-
sure in Germany) was processed by the RKI EOC. It was 
not possible to calculate accurate attack rates or dis-
tinguish between high- or low-risk contacts since data 
on the intensity of the contact, the number of contacts 
per COVID-19 case and the number of subsequently 
infected contacts was not available. Furthermore, the 
country or context of exposure was not always clear.
Conclusion 
Cross-border contact tracing in the current COVID-19 
pandemic requires a lot of resources but is a critical 
component of the outbreak response in Germany and 
should be considered as one of the pillars of national 
preparedness and response strategies. A large pool 
of continuously trained staff and constant feedback 
can foster efficient workflows and helps spread the 
continuous high workload and knowledge to a suf-
ficient number of qualified professionals to secure 
sustainability. Travel-related exposure events play 
an important role in cross-border contact tracing and 
associated challenges should be further addressed, 
including the need for efficient communication with 
all involved stakeholders. Consequently, national and 
international conveyance and tour operators should 
be legally obliged to store a minimal dataset of pas-
senger data including name and contact details as well 
as seat or cabin information (as appropriate). Contact 
points for inquiries of competent PHA with provision of 
data within 24 h should be required. In addition, the 
implementation of a global platform for data exchange 
between the transport sector and PHA should be evalu-
ated on an international level.
EWRS was perceived by the team as efficient for the 
rapid and secure international data exchange, espe-
cially in the face of the high data protection law require-
ments. A similar protected global platform should be 
established for IHR NFPs and within Germany to avoid 
unnecessarily time-consuming data exchanges. In 
addition, a standard protocol for minimal information 
requirements could streamline the national and inter-
national exchange of personal data.
For the future, an evaluation of the effectiveness of 
cross-border contact tracing, considering data and 
experiences from the perspective of an EU/EEA or WHO 
member state could help guide the most efficient strat-
egies and lead to a harmonised international approach 
of cross-border contact tracing.
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